TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Contributors | ................. vii
| Preface | .......... ix

| Introduction | ................. 1
| ANDREW S. MASON

| Zeno between Kition and Athens | ................. 11
| JACQUES BRUNSCHWIG

| Zeno before and after Stoicism | ................. 29
| DAVID HAHM

| Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy | ................. 57
| JAAP MANSFELD

| Zeno’s Arguments | ................. 81
| KATERINA IERODIAKONOU

| Zeno’s Epistemology and Plato’s Theaetetus | ................. 113
| ANTHONY A. LONG

| Zeno’s Definition of phantasia kataleptike | ................. 133
| DAVID SEDLEY

| Zeno of Citium and Stoic Cosmology: Some Notes and Two Case Studies | ................. 155
| KEIMPE ALGRA

| Zeno and Psychological Monism: Some Observations on the Textual Evidence | ................. 185
| TEUN TIELEMAN

v
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zeno and Chrysippus on Emotion</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Sorabji</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoiic <em>oikeiosis</em> and Xenophon’s Socrates</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Erler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoria and Stoic Virtue: Zeno’s Legacy in Cicero, <em>Tusculanae disputationes V</em></td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximilian Forschner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>Politeiai</em> of Zeno and Plato</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Rowe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Impossible Hypotheses”: Was Zeno’s <em>Republic</em> Utopian?</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Schofield</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeno’s Moral and Political Radicalism</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myrto Dragona-Monachou</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeno’s Oral Teaching and the Stimulating Uncertainty of his Doctrines</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Kidd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTRIBUTORS

ñ Jacques Brunschwig is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy in the University of Paris I.

ñ David Hahm is Professor of Greek and Latin in the Ohio State University.

ñ Jaap Mansfeld is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Utrecht.

ñ Katerina Ierodiakonou is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the National Technical University of Athens, and Fellow of St Hugh's College, Oxford.

ñ Anthony A. Long is Irving Stone Professor of Literature in the Department of Classics, University of California at Berkeley.

ñ David Sedley is Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Christ’s College.

ñ Keimpe Algra is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Utrecht.

ñ Teun Tieleman is Research Fellow in Philosophy in the Catholic University of Nijmegen.

ñ Richard Sorabji is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in King’s College, London, and Fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford.

ñ Michael Erler is Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Wurzburg.

ñ Maximilian Forschner is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.

ñ Christopher Rowe is Professor of Greek in the University of Durham.
Malcolm Schofield is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of St John’s College.

Myrto Dragona-Monachou is Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens.

Ian Kidd is Professor Emeritus of Greek in the University of St. Andrews.

Theodore Scaltsas is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.

Andrew S. Mason is Research Fellow with the Archelogs Projects, and Honorary Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
PREFACE

One should no longer say “I am a citizen of Athens or of Sidon”, but “I am a citizen of the world”!

Nothing is of more current interest and relevance than Zeno’s globalism, based on a morality of reason. He advocated a life of virtue, which is invulnerable and indifferent to adversity in the physical, the social, or the emotional spheres. Social conventions, he held, should be eliminated, and society should run on the basis of the goodness of its wise, virtuous, citizens. Harmony should prevail in the world, with reason, Logos, bridging the divide between society and nature. Such are the thoughts that gave rise to the celebrated school of Stoic thought, stemming from Zeno of Citium, who created his philosophical system by bringing together disparate intuitions and insights from Socrates, Heraclitus, the Cynics, and the Academics.

I was honoured and delighted to be asked by the Municipality of Larnaca, the ancient city of Citium, and the Pierides Foundation, to organise a conference on its Philosopher, Zeno. The Stoic scholars invited, international specialists in the philosophy of Zeno, responded with enthusiasm to the call for a fresh look at Zeno’s thought. The result was first, a stimulating and creative Conference in Larnaca, 9-13 September, 1998, where initial proposals were exchanged and put to the test of peer criticism, and secondly, the present volume of final contributions by the Conference participants.

A deeply felt ‘thank you’ is expressed by all of us who were invited and participated in the Conference for the warm hospitality we received in the hands of the Municipality and the Pierides Foundation. We are especially grateful to Mr Pierides for his personal attention to the welfare of the participants, which made our stay in Larnaca unforgottably rich in impressions of the culture and the beauty of the place and its people.

The Conference, as well as the volume, are the first in a series entitled: Zeno of Citium and his Legacy, which will continue triennially in Larnaca, under the auspices of the Municipality and
the Pierides Foundation, dedicated to the in depth study of the philosophy of Zeno’s school of thought. Diogenes Laertius (3rd Century AD) tells us that “The Athenians had a great respect for Zeno, so that they gave him the keys of their walls, and they also honoured him with a golden crown, and a brazen statue; and this was also done by his own countrymen who thought the statue of such a man an honour to their city.” Presently, his own countrymen are paying a further, even higher, tribute to the greatness of their Philosopher: they are attracting the most celebrated students of Zeno’s thought to his birthplace, to study his system, and deliver their understanding to academia internationally.

Theodore Scaltsas
Introduction

ANDREW S. MASON

The essays brought together in this volume, arising from a conference held in Larnaca in 1998, come from scholars working in many areas of Ancient Philosophy, and represent the wide interest that now exists in Zeno and his school. They are concerned with many aspects of Zeno’s life, his contribution to philosophy, and his later influence.

The volume begins with essays on Zeno’s biography, and then deals, in turn, with his contribution to each of the areas of philosophy recognised by the Stoics, logic, physics and ethics.

Jacques Brunschwig focuses on Zeno’s life, arguing that his reception at Athens, despite his Cypriot birth and Phoenician descent, is an example of the successful integration of an immigrant. This, he suggests, was made possible by circumstances both in Cyprus – the Hellenisation of the island and widespread availability of books – and in Athens – the absence of xenophobia and an attitude of philosophical tolerance. Zeno appears as a cosmopolitan, proud of his origins, rising above Athenian parochialism, yet fully integrated into his adopted city; the extent of his integration is revealed by the decree passed by the Athenians in his honour (though this also contains an element of self-praise, revealing the Athenians’ pride in their tolerant attitude).

David Hahm’s paper is concerned, not with the actual life of Zeno, but with the presentation of his biography by later writers. He argues that the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, which represents a Stoic tradition originating in the first or late 2nd century BC, presents Zeno’s life as exemplifying the Stoic theory of moral development, in which a natural human potential for virtue must be encouraged by training and the guidance of a teacher. It also seeks to place Zeno in an ordered sequence of teachers and
pupils going back to Socrates, and presents him as the founder of a well-defined school, identified by adherence to his doctrines. Hahn suggests that other traditions point to an alternative view of Zeno, as having turned to philosophy through a radical conversion in which he rejected conventional values, as a less dogmatic and more exploratory thinker, and as the inspirer of a circle of philosophers rather than the founder of a formal school.

Jaap Mansfeld takes as his theme Zeno’s conception of philosophy as a whole. Starting from a fragment preserved by Epictetus, he argues that Zeno, while distinguishing various parts of philosophy (logic, ethics and physics) also emphasised their interdependence. The philosopher must be concerned with the stoicheia (elements or first principles) of philosophical doctrine in each of these areas, with the way they fit together, and also with what follows from them; i.e., not only the derived propositions of philosophy, but also their implications for practical life.

Katerina Ierodiakonou examines the logical form of the arguments preserved under Zeno’s name, arguing that in many cases our sources can be seen to represent these arguments in a form close to that used by Zeno himself. She argues that, while Stoic formal logic was the work of Chrysippus, Zeno’s arguments can be shown to embody a number of sophisticated structures, which reveal a knowledge of logical forms. Zeno’s use of these forms can be seen both as reflecting earlier logical theory, and as influencing the later development of Stoic logic.

Two contributors focus on Zeno’s epistemology, and in particular on one of his most distinctive contributions to philosophy, the concept of a phantasia kataleptike or ‘cognitive impression’. Anthony Long investigates the origins of this concept, and suggests that it was inspired by Plato’s Theaetetus, drawing many elements from that dialogue, including the term phantasia, and the ideas of appearances being ‘stamped’ on the soul, of knowledge as involving ‘grasping’, and of a mark which distinguishes the object of knowledge from all other things. The phantasia kataleptike can thus be seen as Zeno’s appropriation and modification of the thought of Socrates as presented by Plato, while the opposition of the Academic Arcesilaus to the concept
represents an attempt to detach Socrates and Plato from Zeno.

David Sedley offers a new interpretation of Zeno’s definition of a cognitive impression, as one which is ‘from what is, moulded and stamped in accordance with that very thing which is, and of a kind which could not arise from what is not’. He argues that *apo huparchontos*, ‘from what is’, should be read as meaning, not that the impression is caused by what is actual, but that it represents what is actual, i.e. that it is veridical; thus the final clause can be taken to mean that a cognitive impression is one which could not fail to be veridical. Interpreting the definition in this way allows it to be extended to non-perceptual impressions, and so to accommodate non-empirical knowledge.

Keimpe Algra, examining Stoic cosmology, argues for the difficulty of establishing the nature and extent of Zeno’s contribution; we have hardly any verbatim reports of his position, and confusion is caused by the tendency of doxographers to ascribe common Stoic doctrine to ‘Zeno’ or ‘Zeno and his school’. Considering two specific cases of doctrines often ascribed to Zeno, he holds that the theory of the coherence of the cosmos is a school doctrine which may, but need not, originate with Zeno; while the definitions of space, place and void cannot be Zeno’s, but represent a later reformulation or reinterpretation of the views of Chrysippus. He concludes that Zeno’s primary interests were in ‘logic’ (mainly epistemology) and ethics, and while he originated the Stoic physical system, he made little contribution to the details of the subject; these were worked out later by Sphaerus, Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

Teun Tieleman considers the doctrine of ‘psychological monism’ which has been ascribed to Zeno, and argues that this term is not wholly appropriate; while Zeno does not accept the Platonic and Aristotelian division of the soul into rational and non-rational parts, he does posit an opposition between individual character, conditioned by the body, and the guidance of the soul by the all-pervading divine intellect. He develops this view against the background of the Stoic conception of the world as a continuous whole; this idea is developed in two directions; on the one hand the soul’s continuity with the cosmos at large, and its communion with
the divine intellect; on the other the soul’s continuity with the body, which can act as a source of disturbance in it.

Richard Sorabji also deals with Zeno’s psychology, focusing on his theory of the emotions, and arguing that he held a different theory of emotion from that later adopted by Chrysippus; while for Chrysippus emotions are primarily false judgements, for Zeno they are movements of the soul opposed to one’s better judgement. Chrysippus had difficulty accommodating Zeno’s view, and the problem was pointed out by Posidonius and Galen; it thus became a stimulus to further thought, with Seneca attempting a solution by distinguishing the false judgement of emotion proper from the irrational movement of the soul, the propatheia or ‘first movement’. Sorabji joins Tieleman in rejecting the view that Zeno believed in Platonic divisions of the soul, yet arguing that Zeno’s view should be distinguished from the rationalism of later Stoicism.

Michael Erler’s paper is concerned with the origins of Stoic ethics; he argues that Socrates, as presented by Xenophon, may have influenced the development of the Stoic conception of oikeiosis. In Memorabilia I.2 Socrates is presented as arguing that the value of other people to us depends not simply on whether they are related (oikeoi), but on their usefulness; even parts of our own body are valuable to us only if they are useful. This idea, which is echoed by Plato in the Lysis and Symposium, is also found in a fragment of Zeno (SVF I.263) which may have played a part in the development of the doctrine of oikeiosis. The criticism of the Stoic doctrine by the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus also refers to Socrates as a possible source for the concept.

Maximilian Forschner argues that, in the original Stoic conception of virtue, as exemplified by Zeno, contemplation of nature, rather than the practical life, played a central role. In this the Stoics followed a tradition derived from the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Socrates as presented by Xenophon. Forschner argues that the shift to a more practical conception of virtue was primarily the work of Cicero, and was motivated by his academic scepticism, which led him to see knowledge of nature as unattainable in this life, and hence to focus more on social and political aspects of the good life.
Two authors focus on Zeno’s *Politeia*. Christopher Rowe argues that Zeno wrote the work in response to Plato’s work of the same name, and as an interpreter of Socrates; many of Zeno’s proposals, such as the rejection of ‘general education’, the restriction of citizenship to the good, and the abolition of temples, lawcourts and gymnasia, can be seen as criticisms of Plato’s ideal state, inspired by Socratic intellectualism, and representing an ideal of the city which Plato might (in Zeno’s view) have reached if he had remained more faithful to Socrates. Zeno can also be seen as incorporating into his city a Socratic conception of love, inspired by the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.

Malcolm Schofield argues that the *Politeia*, in its original context, should not be seen as a utopian work describing an unattainable ideal; Zeno (in contrast to Plato) wrote for ‘the places in which he found himself and the times in which he lived’. The work described a community which could be achieved if people began to exercise their capacity for virtue; Zeno may have seen his own circle of companions in the Stoa as a step towards such a community. It is true that Stoic doubts about the possibility of finding a virtuous person would also have cast doubt on the achievability of the ideal community; but, Schofield argues, these doubts may have developed after the writing of the *Politeia*, in response to Epicurus’ claim of wisdom for himself and his pupils.

Myrto Dragona-Monachou’s paper is concerned with the impact of Zeno’s moral and political doctrines on later thought, and their continuing relevance down to modern times. She argues that Zeno’s radicalism, which marks a distinctive break with earlier patterns of thinking, makes his thought particularly significant for the development of modern moral concepts. The contemporary relevance of his thought is discussed in three contexts; first, a number of recent attempts to find in Stoicism a basis for environmental ethics; second, the proposal by Lawrence Becker to introduce a new Stoicism, adapted to modern science, and freed from the teleological approach of ancient Stoicism; and finally the influence of Stoic doctrines of natural law on the development of the concept of human rights, approached through recent discussions about the extent to which a concept of human rights
Ian Kidd, in a paper which in many ways sums up the overall themes of the collection, emphasises the uncertainty of our knowledge of Zeno’s teaching, transmitted as it is in fragments, but also the way in which this uncertainty, present from the beginning of the Stoic school, was a stimulus to later thought. Although Chrysippus was responsible for the detailed working out of much of Stoic doctrine, Zeno’s thought was still known to later Stoics, not only through his writings but through an oral tradition; and it was possible for them to appeal to him, as founder of the school, over the head of Chrysippus; but because of the uncertainty of his doctrines, this gave rise to debates about his precise views, which can be found in later writers, and were an inspiration to continued philosophical inquiry.

No single theme, apart from the figure of Zeno himself, unites the topics dealt with here; nevertheless a number of themes emerge from the volume as a whole. One of these is the wide range of Zeno’s philosophical thought. The various papers deal with his contributions to epistemology, to the theory of nature (including psychology) and to ethics (including politics), and also with his influence on the development of logic, though he was not himself a formal logician.

Another central theme is that of Zeno as part of a continuing philosophical tradition. Several contributors deal with the way in which he is influenced by, and responds to, earlier thinkers; Anthony Long and Christopher Rowe point to the influence of Plato, Michael Erler to that of Socrates, as presented by Xenophon; Maximilian Forschner argues that Zeno belongs to a contemplative tradition represented by Plato and the Pythagoreans; Katerina Ierodiakonou refers to the influence on him of earlier logical thought; though others, in particular David Hahm and Myrto Dragona-Monachou, draw attention to ways in which his philosophy may be seen as marking a radical break with the past. Meanwhile, the way in which he acted as a stimulus to later thought is emphasised by, among others, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Richard Sorabji, Myrto Dragona-Monachou and Ian Kidd.

A final theme, linked with this last, is the uncertainty of our
knowledge of Zeno, and the way in which he has become a mysterious figure, as we see him from the point of view of later Stoicism. This is emphasised by David Hahm in connection with Zeno’s biography; by Keimpe Algra in relation to his cosmological thought; by Maximilian Forchner in relation to his ethics (arguing that Stoic ethics as we know them are the result of a significant transformation in later antiquity), and by Ian Kidd in relation to his philosophy as a whole. Yet this very uncertainty allowed Zeno to become a stimulus to continuing philosophical thought, as he was in later antiquity and is to this day.
Zeno and Chrysippus on Emotion

RICHARD SORABJI

I want to argue that Zeno's account of emotions (pathe) was very different from Chrysippus'. This was once maintained by Pohlenz, but on unsatisfactory grounds, so that his conclusion has been widely dismissed. Pohlenz thought, wrongly I believe, that Zeno endorsed Plato's tripartition of the soul. This brought his view into disfavour, which was unfortunate. For in one respect, I shall claim, he could have gone further: Zeno's conception of disobedience to reason may have been even more at odds with Chrysippus' main ideas than Pohlenz said.

Chrysippus made two very unusual moves: he identified emotions with judgments and, still more surprisingly, with false judgments. Zeno had taken the much more commonplace view that emotions are merely caused by judgments and that judgments are not even sufficient conditions for emotion. Moreover his idea of disobedience to reason is not and does not imply Chrysippus' idea about falsity. Let us look at the differences between Zeno and Chrysippus more closely.

Differences:

1.

We are told that Chrysippus wrote out definitions of emotion which Zeno had pronounced orally, and there is more than one

---

1 Pohlenz, (1948). vol. 1, 141-153, with notes in vol. 2; Pohlenz (1938).
definition discussed both of emotion in general and of the four main kinds of emotion established by Zeno: pleasure and distress, fear and appetite. Many other emotions are defined, but only as species of these four. We are also told in a very explicit way, which contrasts with the casual statements of other sources, that Chrysippus thought the emotions actually were judgments, whereas Zeno and many other Stoics thought the emotions occurred on the occasion of (eπi) judgments, but (at least in the case of distress and pleasure) actually were contractions and expansions. Only once is Zeno recorded as actually defining distress as being a judgment and I take it to be easiest to regard this as a shorthand. Of course judgment would be involved as the cause or occasion of distress.

Zeno gives a large number of definitions, many of which identify emotions with movements, rather than with judgments. Not only are pleasure and distress expansions and contractions, but appetite and fear are reachings (ορεξείς) and leanings away (ἐκκλίσεις). One of Zeno’s general definitions of emotion is that it is a movement of the soul. It is Zeno too, we shall see, who introduces the idea that every emotion is a fluttering (πτοία). Moreover, it turns out in a discussion, whose explicit subject is admittedly Chrysippus, not Zeno, that it is not only pleasure and distress which, at least by Chrysippus’ time, involve some kind of contraction or expansion. Fear involves an internal sinking or massing of the mind at the centre. (I suggest reading συμβροισείς instead of συνθροίσεις in the relevant passage of Plutarch.) And

---

2 Galen PHP 4.7.2.
3 Galen PHP 4.2.1-14.
4 Galen PHP 4.2.5-6; 4.3.1-2; 5.1.4; cf. 5.6.42.
5 Galen PHP 4.7.2-3.
7 Diogenes Laertius Lives 7.110; Cicero Tus. 4.11 and 4.4; Off 1.136; Stobaeus 2.88.9 Wachsmuth - Hense (SVF 1.205).
8 Stobaeus 2.39.5. (SVF 1.206).
9 Cicero Tus. 4.15, recessus animi; Galen PHP 3.5.43-4, de Lacy p. 208 sundromé, sunizanousin, sunagomenoi. At Plutarch Mor. Virt. 449A.
anger, which is a type of appetite, involves a felt blowing as if of vapour out of the heart.10

Chrysippus’ switch to defining emotions as judgments rather than movements had been anticipated only to the extent that Plato identifies fear with expectation of evil.11 But Plato makes no use of this innovation and in one case he juxtaposes it with a treatment of desire as merely caused by judgment. At any rate, in adjacent lines of the Protagoras, Plato puts it as a point about human nature that ‘it is not in human nature to be willing (ethelein) to go after what one thinks bad instead of good things’.12 The unwillingness here is distinct from the thinking bad and merely caused by it. Aristotle as well as Plato had anticipated Zeno’s general approach of making judgments into causes. It has been pointed out that he consciously defines anger as occurring through (dia) the appearance of harm and argues that ‘with’ (meta), a term used in Plato’s account of pleasure at Philebus 37E10, does not sufficiently bring out the relation.13 I will explain below why I think the shift from causation to identity was a necessary prerequisite for the introduction of the theory of first movements or prepassions. For now let me explain the judgments and the contractions. Chrysippus distinguishes two judgments as constituting any one of the four main emotions.14 There is the judgment that there is good or bad (benefit or harm) at hand in the present or future and the judgment that it is appropriate (kathêkei) to react. These two judgments can be rolled into one, but

sunthiroêseis (perplexities) or sunorouseis (an unattested compound of orouseis, a type of impulse) in place of the unknown suneorseis are current conjectures. But ‘perplexities’ and impulses’ do not fit the context, which tells us that the Stoics talk about bites and suneorseis instead of distress and fear. Sunathroiseis, massing together, would fit perfectly both with bites on the one hand and with the concomitants of fear cited by Cicero and Galen: recessus, sundromê, sunisazousin, sunagomenoi.

10 Galen PHP 3.1.25, de Lacy p. 172.
11 Plato Laches 198B; Protagoras 358D; Laws 644 C-D.
12 Plato Protagoras 358D.
14 See Cicero Tusc. 4.11-14; Diogenes Laertius 7.110-114; ps-Andronicus On Emotions 1-5;
for three purposes which I will come to later, Chrysippus at least wants to distinguish them. The reactions judged appropriate in the case of appetite and fear are behavioural, respectively reaching for and avoiding. In the case of pleasure and distress, the reactions judged appropriate are expansion and contraction. What are expansion and contraction?

Scholars have been puzzled, but I think the answer is given in a text of Galen’s, which is not in von Arnim’s collection and may therefore not have had its fair share of attention. The discussion there concerns bites, which are sharp little contractions, and related phenomena. Contractions and expansions turn out to be the sinking or expansion of the physical soul which we actually sense (sunaisthanesthai, ekphanês, enargês) in the chest. For Chrysippus, this is merely an effect of emotion, not emotion itself. I would add that presumably we not only sense the sinking or expansion, but sense it as bad or good, since otherwise we would not judge it appropriate to our situation. The whole account seems to me very true to life. Who has not felt sinkings or expansive feelings in the chest in emotional situations? The only difference is that we nowadays interpret them as physiologically based, not as based on a soul, not even a physical soul.

Zeno gave many more definitions of emotion. Of emotion in general he says that it is an excessive impulse (pleonazousa hormê). Another definition of Zeno’s is that emotion is an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature.
Zeno further adds that emotions are disobedient (apeithêς, Latin non obtemporans) to reason and are perversions (diastrophai) of reason, in which one is turned away (Latin aversa representing Greek apostrephêsthai) from reason, or from right reason.

Galen reports Chrysippus’ discussion of these Zonsonian definitions. All Zeno’s terms appear, except that we find only apostrephêsthai, not the related diastrephêsthai. These descriptions turn out to be very different from Chrysippus’ main definition, because Chrysippus distinguishes Zeno’s disobedience to, and turning away from, reason from what in Chrysippus’ own words is described as being misled by error (diêmartêmenôs pheresthai) and overlooking something while in accordance with reason (paridon ti kata to logon). Galen supplies an example of such a mistake, presumably taken from Chrysippus: scorning your children’s life to save your country. The reference is to Agamemnon sacrificing his daughter, so that the Greek army could sail to Troy. The example is one of erroneous value judgments and it is precisely erroneous value judgments that, in the account Chrysippus made standard, constitute emotion. But on the Zonsonian account, as Chrysippus here interprets it, more is needed, an actual disobedience to reason. By this what seems to be meant is not merely, as Pohlenz thought, going against right reason, but going against one’s own better judgment. It may be for this reason that Chrysippus describes emotion as involving akrasia, which Seneca renders in Latin by impotens. The literal meaning of akrasia is being out of control, but Aristotle had made it the standard term for going against one’s better judgment.

The example supplied by Galen, and again presumably taken by

---

19 Themistius in DA 107, 17-18 (SVF 1.208).
20 Galen PHP 4.2.8-27.
21 Galen PHP 4.2.12 and 24; 4.4.23.
22 Galen PHP 4.2.26-7.
23 Galen PHP 4.4.24; Seneca On Anger 2.4.1.
24 Aristotle, esp. NE 7. 1-10.
25 Galen PHP 4.2.27.
him from Chrysippus, of what satisfies Zeno's requirements for emotion is the story of Medea, who slew her children, to take vengeance on her husband Jason. Unlike Agamemnon, she says she understands how bad the result of her deed will be.\textsuperscript{25} This is what illustrates disobeying your reason as opposed to making a mistake of reason. Medea, unlike Agamemnon, goes against her better judgment. If Zeno confined the term \textit{pathos} to cases like this, we can see not only how the idea got into the Stoic literature that emotion is \textit{akrasia}, but also why Zeno said that emotion is a fluttering (\textit{ptoia}) of the soul.\textsuperscript{26} This is not just a verbal borrowing from Plato.\textsuperscript{27} Emotion is said to involve an \textit{oscillation} of the \textit{mind}.\textsuperscript{28} And it fits all \textit{pathos}, if \textit{pathos} is confined as Zeno seems to confine it, to cases like that of Medea, who speaks now of the good (revenge), now of the bad in what she is going to do. Agamemnon, by contrast, is not in two minds, if he scorns his child's life, so does not fit Zeno's criteria for \textit{pathos}. This is surprising. Admittedly his scorning his child's life may not look like an emotion, but his desire to avenge the Greeks and his fear that the storm would prevent this do. Chrysippus can account for this by reference to Agamemnon's false value judgments; Zeno cannot.

Chrysippus may have been simply expounding Zeno, rather than trying to accommodate what Zeno had said. Certainly, it is difficult for him to accommodate, and I think what happened next in Stoicism was that the discrepancy was pointed out by Posidonius and by whoever is the source of Galen's objections to Chrysippus, probably Posidonius again. Galen repeatedly points to the contradiction in saying with Chrysippus that emotions are mistaken judgments of reason and then saying that they are without reason, without judgment, and, even more clearly, that instead of being...

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Stobaeus 2.39.5 (\textit{SVF} 1.206).
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Plato \textit{Republic} 439D.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Plutarch \textit{On Moral Virtue} 446F-447A (\textit{SVF} 3.459).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Galen \textit{PHP} 4.2.8; 4.2.12; 4.2.25; 4.4.5; 4.4.17; 4.4.20; 4.4.21; 4.4.23; 4.5.4; 5.4.14; Stobaeus 2.88.8-2.90.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Posidonius at Galen \textit{PHP} 4.5.42-3; cf. 4.6.27.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Seneca \textit{On Anger} 2.4.1.
\end{itemize}
mistaken judgments, they are cases of disobedience to reason.\textsuperscript{29} Galen records a related criticism from Posidonius.\textsuperscript{30} Seneca, I think, records a defence of Chrysippus, whether his own or one he is repeating.\textsuperscript{31} The defence takes the form of distinguishing three different stages or movements in an outburst of anger. I will come to the first movement later. The mistaken judgments are the second movement. The disobedience to reason is accommodated by making it a third and later stage. Chrysippus may already have tried this defence, but I slightly doubt it, because to make the account fit a sufficiently wide range of cases, Seneca has to change the example of disobedience to reason considerably. It is no longer like the case of Medea, who could see the truth, that the result would be bad. In Seneca, the angry person oscillates not between truth and falsity, but between one falsity (it is appropriate to take revenge) and another even more extravagant falsity, which forgets about appropriateness and judges: I must be revenged, come what may. This is true to life. One can see these stages in anger and even time them.

Galen has been censured in recent literature for unjustifiedly complaining of contradictions.\textsuperscript{32} But I have elsewhere tried to defend him\textsuperscript{33} and I think if he is misleading us, it is more likely in suggesting that Chrysippus intended to reconcile the two accounts of emotion. Galen is surely right that they are hard to reconcile.

The last difference immediately creates a further one. For Zeno already espoused the ideal of apatheia, freedom from pathos. But it now looks as if all he meant by this was freedom from emotions like Medea's. What Chrysippus meant, by contrast will have been freedom from almost the whole range of what we call emotions, with

\textsuperscript{29} Fillion-Lahille 1984; Cooper 1998 and Gill 1998.
\textsuperscript{30} Sorabji (2000).
what I take to be a few exceptions, most notably the so-called eupatheiai, which are found only in that rare being, the Stoic sage, and which involve no mistaken judgments (for example, properly grounded joy at God's good governance of the universe). It is because Chrysippus wanted to eradicate nearly all of what we call emotion that I have translated pathos as emotion, not passion. Passions are nowadays thought of as particularly violent emotions. It was not just these that Chrysippus sought to eradicate, although Zeno might have been content with something more like that.

Admittedly, in antiquity the Stoics' opponents often claimed that the Stoics did not really seek to eradicate more than the extreme emotions. But this, so I shall argue elsewhere, so far from being an objective report, was a polemical move, seeking to smother a real disagreement by pretending it was a bogus one. The dodge was to say, 'the Stoics cannot really bring themselves to disagree with the rest of us'.

4

Zeno defined all emotion as desire, hormê, usually translated impulse, and Chrysippus must have agreed. How does this fit with Chrysippus' idea that all emotion is judgment? We tend to contrast desire with judgment as being conation as against cognition. But Chrysippus would have had no problem, because there was a Stoic view that impulse just is the judgment (i.e. in Stoic terms, assent to the appearance) that it is appropriate to act. This emerges from two passages in Stobaeus, one of which says that an impulse for the Stoics is an assent and the other of which says that what stirs impulse is an impulsive appearance that something is appropriate. It is clear that Seneca takes this view in his account of anger. After

34 ibid.
35 Stobaeus 2, 88, 1 and 86, 17-18.
36 On Anger 2.3.4-2.4.1.
speaking of assent to the appearance of injustice, he describes the second component in anger not as assent to the appearance that it is appropriate to be avenged, but as an impulse to the effect that (voluntas tamquam) it is appropriate to be avenged. He sees the idea of impulse as interchangeable with that of assent to such an appearance.

But would Zeno agree with this? He thinks that emotions are impulses, but not judgments, rather the effect of judgments. It is possible, therefore, that he thought of impulse not as identical with judgment, but as the effect of judgment.

5

A question arises about Zeno's contractions and expansions. How can any emotions be contractions and expansions, if they are also impulses? This perhaps gives motivation to the suggestion scholars have sometimes made that contractions and expansions of the soul are impulses, or at least are the physical aspect of impulses. But if so, the grounds for such an interpretation concern Zeno alone. There is no hint of such a view, when Galen discusses Chrysippus' treatment of contractions and expansions. And for Seneca, the view is ruled out, I believe, because of his conception of mental first movements. I shall argue that these are indeed contractions and expansions of the mind, but this is meant to make them quite different from impulses. Let us consider them.

6

Seneca seeks to prove that anger can be eliminated by rational means, because it is a voluntary assent of the mind to certain

---

37 On Anger 2.2-2.4.
appearances. He therefore needs to distinguish anger sharply from involuntary first movements, as he calls them.\textsuperscript{37} Even the mere appearance of benefit or harm, before there has been any assent or impulse, is enough to trigger involuntary first movements of body or mind. The bodily ones are clearly illustrated: tears, growing pale, trembling, etc. But what are the mental ones? The best clue is given by an earlier text in Cicero, who describes how the Stoics by his time (after Posidonius) believe that involuntary bites and little contractions can occur without any judgment or assent of the mind.\textsuperscript{38} These are ideal candidates for playing the role of Seneca's involuntary mental first movements which occur before any judgment, impulse, or assent of the mind and which are therefore quite distinct from emotion. Seneca's idea would be ruined if impulses were themselves contractions and expansions. For then the alleged difference between involuntary contractions and voluntary emotions conceived as assents, judgments and impulses would have broken down and with it the claim that there is a rational therapy for one, not the other.

Therapy can actually make use of the contrast in a further way. People can be panicked by their own involuntary reactions. What William James said is sometimes true: we are sad because we cry. It can be a therapeutic technique to say to oneself, 'these are only tears (or only sinking feelings). The question is whether I am actually in a bad position'. Contrary to some interpretations, I think the idea of first movements was important to Stoic therapy.

Did Zeno yet have the idea of first movements, or prepassions as they were also called? I think not. Seneca says that the wise person will still feel suspicions and shadows of emotions because, as Zeno says a scar may remain even in the sage's mind.\textsuperscript{39} I doubt if this shows Zeno to have been discussing first movements. Scars, which are the only idea clearly ascribed to him here, are not normally needed for the experiencing of first movements. But for once this

\textsuperscript{38} Cicero \textit{Tusc.} 3.83.
\textsuperscript{39} Seneca \textit{On Anger} 1.16.7.
\textsuperscript{40} Sorabji (2000).
may not create a difference between Zeno and Chrysippus, because there is only the slenderest evidence that Chrysippus postulated first movements either.

The guess I have made elsewhere\textsuperscript{40} is that first movements were introduced to defend Chrysippus against the objections of Posidonius. Posidonius had objected that judgments are not needed for emotion in the case of disowned tears, reactions to wordless music, or in the case of animal emotions. Seneca takes up all three examples alongside others, and, without mentioning Posidonius, denies that they involve genuine emotion. The first two at least are treated as cases of first movement.\textsuperscript{41}

The case for Chrysippus discussing first movements turns on his discussion of weeping against your will. He says\textsuperscript{42} that this is due to unlike appearances, and the appearance he has just been talking about is one directed towards sinkings or contractions of the soul. Apparently, he is appealing to conflicting appearances as to whether such contractions are appropriate. The tears are against your will because you assent to the appearance that contractions are not appropriate. But Chrysippus does not say whether your assent oscillates between both appearances, or whether the rival appearance, that contractions are appropriate, remains without assent. It is only in the latter case that Chrysippus will have postulated a first movement, that is, tears produced by mere appearance independently of assent. Even if he did postulate this, he will have stumbled into the matter as a side issue. First movements do not have for Chrysippus the centrality they acquire in Seneca \textit{On Anger} 2.1-4, and in Epictetus fragment 9 (reported by Aulus Gellius \textit{Attic Nights} 19.1).

\textsuperscript{40}Seneca \textit{On Anger} 1.3.7-8; 2.2-3; Posidonius in Galen \textit{PHP}, see 4.7.12 and 37; 5.6.37-8; 5.6.21-2.
\textsuperscript{41}Galen \textit{PHP} 4.7.16, de Lacy p. 284.
Zeno does not clearly require, like Chrysippus, that the judgments involved in emotion should be false. Indeed, Medea seems to have a mixture of true and false judgments between which she oscillates. It is true that Zeno might be expected to think false judgment is usually involved, because he is credited with introducing the idea that everything except character is a matter of indifference. In that case, the judgments of good or bad which cause emotions could be expected to be mistaken, whenever they concern indifferents, which they normally do. But there is a different case which came to be discussed eventually, that of Alcibiades, who was distressed about a non-indifferent, his bad character. It is easy to see how Chrysippus would have handled this, because he repeatedly insists on the falsity of the second judgment involved in emotion, the judgment that it is appropriate to react. Alcibiades was right that his character was a genuinely bad thing, but he was wrong that the appropriate reaction was disturbing contractions, the very opposite of Stoic composure. The appropriate reaction would in fact have been to improve his character. Zeno is not recorded as having attended to the distinction between the two judgments of badness and of appropriate reaction. So, if he had considered the case of Alcibiades at all, he would have had to work hard to say where the falsity of judgment came in. I think it more likely that he attended only to the conflict of judgments in emotion, without particularly attending to the falsity of at least one of them.

Chrysippus had at least two other reasons for distinguishing

---

43 Stobaeus 2.84.21; Cicero Ac. Post. 1.37 (SVF 1.192-3).
44 Cicero Tusc. 3.77-8.
45 Cicero Tusc. 3.61; 68; 70; 77-8; 4.61.
46 Cicero Tusc. 3.76.
the second judgment in emotion, the judgment of appropriateness. First he thought that in calming emotion, it was more effective to attack this second judgment than the judgment that things were good or bad. Secondly, he seems to have appealed to the judgment of appropriateness (which constitutes the impulse in emotion), in order to solve a difficulty for his theory, that sometimes distress seems to fade, even though the judgment of badness is still intact. He answers that at least the second judgment, the impulse towards contraction, will have faded.

None of these motives for distinguishing the second judgment is connected by our sources with Zeno, even though his belief that all emotion is impulse might seem to require that it is at least caused by a judgment of appropriateness.

Zeno saw that judgments of harm and benefit are not sufficient for emotion in two different cases. Not only does he seem to have treated Agamemnon’s value judgments as not causing emotion, but it was Zeno who spotted the phenomenon of distress and pleasure fading, even though the judgment of good or bad is intact. His own solution, however, is not, like Chrysippus, to insist on a second judgment remaining intact, but simply to insert the requirement that the judgment be fresh, if it is to cause these emotions. He thereby allows that the judgment is not sufficient for emotion. Posidonius complains that the requirement of freshness is unexplanatory.

---

48 Cicero Tusc. 3.75 (SVF 1.212); Galen PHP 4.2.1; 4.7.2-5 (SVF 3.463); Stobaeus 2.89.2-3; ps-Andronicus On Emotions 1 (SVF 3.391).
The differences between Chrysippus and Zeno are already considerable enough. I am not inclined to add Pohlenz’s star difference, that Zeno still accepted Plato’s tripartition of the soul. Galen tells us that Posidonius had taken Zeno that way, but as Ian Kidd points out in this volume, Galen himself, arch-Platoniser though he may seem to be, demurs. He thinks Zeno adopted some intermediate position between Plato and Chrysippus, but he further acknowledges that the question is not obvious.49

I think it more likely that as suggested also in this volume by Teun Tieleman, Zeno, without deciding the matter, tended to follow the Plato of the Phaedo, who sees the soul as a unitary force opposing the body, rather than the Plato of the Republic, who divides the soul into three powers.

Two possible differences remain. There is no record of Zeno having introduced the recommendation that one should want things only with the reservation (hupexairesis, Latin exceptio) ‘if God wills’.

Finally, there is no record of Zeno having distinguished, like Chrysippus, between emotions (pathê) and the sage’s equanimous states of feeling (eupatheiai) such as joy at God’s good governance of the world. This distinction probably gave Chrysippus an extra reason for insisting on the falsity of emotional judgments, since this

49 Galen PHP 5.6.42.
is part of what distinguishes eupatheiai from pathê, along with their being well grounded (eulogon) judgments. Otherwise eupatheiai have the same structure as pathê, since they are judgments that God's governance, for example, is good and that it is appropriate to experience expansions.

Zeno's contributions

Emphasising the differences between Zeno and Chrysippus must not lead us to overlook the contribution of Zeno. I think Chrysippus was the more startlingly novel, with his identification of emotion with judgment and with false judgment. But Zeno did contribute a lot of the Stoic theory. In contrast with Aristotle, he gave a unified definition of emotion making it all into impulse.\(^{50}\) It was he who selected the four most general kinds of emotion under which the others fall.\(^{51}\) Although the same four had six times been picked out by Plato for other purposes,\(^{52}\) they constitute a difference from Aristotle, whose Rhetoric Book 2 treats as the genera of emotions pleasure, distress and certain kinds of desire, but not fear, which is subsumed under distress. Judgment is treated by Zeno as necessary to all emotion and the notion of judgment is not interchanged, as in Aristotle's Rhetoric, with that of appearance or thought. If we can trust Cicero, Zeno already infers from the role of judgment that emotion is voluntary.\(^{53}\) Zeno seems to have introduced not only the idea that that everything except character is a matter of indifference, but also the further idea that some

\(^{50}\) Diogenes Laertius 7.110; Cicero Tusc. 4.11 and 47; Stobaeus 2.39.5, 44.4; 88.8 (SVF 1.205-6).
\(^{51}\) Diogenes Laertius 7.110 (SVF 1.211).
\(^{52}\) Plato Laches 191D; Symposium 207E; Phaedo 83B; Republic 429C, 430A; Theaetetus 156B.
\(^{53}\) Cicero Ac. Post. 1.38 (SVF 1.207).
indifferents are naturally preferred, some naturally dispreferred, and perhaps the terminology according to which we merely select or disselect them (eklogê, apeklogê), but do not choose them (haireisthai). It is Zeno too who introduces the disobedience to reason which we have seen Seneca still struggling to accommodate. This is a formidable contribution, even if Zeno’s successor Chrysippus was more daring again.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**